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BENEFIT EXPENSES: HOW THE BENEFIT
CORPORATION’S SOCIAL PURPOSE CHANGES
THE ORDINARY AND NECESSARY
ABSTRACT
The recent spread of Benefit Corporations formally challenges the
assumption that for-profit companies are strictly profit maximizing entities. Businesses can now incorporate under charitable business purposes
that were once restricted to 501(c)(3) non-profit organizations. While
incorporating under a charitable purpose is no longer restricted to only
non-profit entities, Benefit Corporations are not able to receive the same
income tax exemption under the Internal Revenue Code. While for-profit entities do receive some tax benefits for their charitable behavior, such as the
charitable donation deduction, the current tax structure does not provide
an equal amount of tax benefits for charitable behavior when performed
by a Benefit Corporation as it does for a 501(c)(3). This Note argues that
the Internal Revenue Code’s entity classification for non-profits and forprofits does not accommodate the mixed-purpose structure of the Benefit
Corporation. This Note will explore the Internal Revenue Code’s treatment of non-profit 501(c)(3)s and charitable behavior by for-profit entities
and posits that the Internal Revenue Code attempts to treat the charitable
behavior of an entity favorably more than it attempts to treat an entity as a
whole favorably. Because charitable behavior is not considered a trade or
business under the Internal Revenue Code, Benefit Corporations will now
be regularly engaging in charitable behavior, the expense of which will
not be categorized as either a charitable deduction or as ordinary and necessary business expenses. This Note suggests that a possible way to give
Benefit Corporations the same tax treatment for its charitable behavior as
non-profits engaging in the same behavior is to create a “Benefit Expense”
deduction akin to the ordinary and necessary business expense deduction
currently available to for-profit entities.
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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the business community’s interest in social responsibility has grown.1 Many for-profit businesses have adopted Corporate Social
Responsibility (CSR) efforts and departments.2 Other businesses seek to
incorporate socially responsible behavior into their entire business structure so that social responsibility is part of the core business operations.3
Many of these businesses find themselves in the emerging fourth sector.
The fourth sector hosts various hybrids of the existing three sectors: private
(for-profit), social (non-profit/NGOs) and public (government).4 These new
businesses are shifting away from the assumption in corporate law that the
only purpose a business can have is to generate profit.5 These new businesses are redefining their business purpose to include both generating
profits and generating benefit for the greater public good.6
One of the most recent business forms to enter into the fourth sector is
the benefit corporation.7 The benefit corporation was created primarily to
address concerns of corporate responsibility, transparency, and accountability.8 A benefit corporation shifts from the traditional shareholder model
of profit-maximization to a stakeholder model, allowing corporations to
act in furtherance of broader social concerns.9 Under the stakeholder model
1

Cassady V. Brewer, A Novel Approach to Using LLCs for Quasi-Charitable Endeavors
(A/K/A “Social Enterprise”), 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 678, 679 (2012); William H.
Clark, Jr. & Elizabeth K. Babson, How Benefit Corporations Are Redefining the Purpose
of Business Corporations, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 817, 819–24 (2012); Robert A.
Katz & Antony Page, The Role of Social Enterprise, 35 VT. L. REV. 59, 60 (2010).
2
Michael R. Deskins, Benefit Corporation Legislation, Version 1.0—A Breakthrough
in Stakeholder Rights?, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1047, 1057–58 (2011).
3
Katz & Page, supra note 1, at 59, 62.
4
HEERAD SABETI, FOURTH SECTOR NETWORK CONCEPT WORKING GROUP, THE
EMERGING FOURTH SECTOR, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 3 (The Aspen Inst., 2009), available
at http://www.aspeninstitute.org/publications/emerging-fourth-sector-executive-summary.
5
Clark & Babson, supra note 1, at 819.
6
Steven Munch, Improving the Benefit Corporation: How Traditional Governance
Mechanisms Can Enhance the Innovative New Business Form, 7 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y
170, 170 (2012).
7
What Is a B Corp?, B LAB, http://www.bcorporation.net/about (accessed by searching
the Internet Archive index for Oct. 14, 2012).
8
Business FAQ’s, BENEFIT CORP INFO. CTR., http://benefitcorp.net/for-business/business
-faqs (last visited Feb. 2, 2013) (“A benefit corporation is a new class of corporation that voluntarily meets higher standards of corporate purpose, accountability, and transparency.”).
9
See generally Clark & Babson, supra note 1; Anup Malani & Eric A. Posner, The
Case for For-Profit Charities, 5 (The Univ. of Chicago Law Sch., John M. Olin Law &
Economics Working Paper No. 304, 2006), available at http://www.law.uchicago.edu
/files/files/304.pdf; Alissa Mickels, Beyond Corporate Social Responsibility: Reconciling
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of business purpose, when a corporation makes a decision, it takes more
than just its shareholders into account; it also considers the impact on, and
interests of, its employees, customers, investors, supply chain, the environment, communities, and more.10 Benefit corporations have been codified by the legislature of twelve states,11 and other states are contemplating
passing the same or similar legislation.12 This legislation creates an entirely
new choice of entity in states that have enacted the legislation.13
The goal of the fourth sector is to create a business structure that lends
itself well to serving two purposes: making profit and doing good.14 One
of the many challenges facing the fourth sector is that current corporate
law requires for-profit organizations to act primarily in the financial interest
of its shareholders and assumes and requires that corporations are profitmaximizing entities.15 This is a legal problem.16 Fourth sector businesses
the Ideals of a For-Benefit Corporation with Director Fiduciary Duties in the U.S. and
Europe, 32 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 271 (2009).
10
Munch, supra note 6, at 176–77.
11
CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 14600–14631 (West 2011); HAW. REV. STAT. § 420D-1 (2012);
805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 40 (2013); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1801 (2012); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch.156E (2012); MD. CODE ANN., Corps. & Ass’ns § 5-6C-01 (West 2011); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-1 (West 2011); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW §§ 1701-1709 (Consol.
2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.02 (2011); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-782 (2011); PA.
H.B. 1616 (2012); 2012 S.C. Laws Act 277 (H.B. 4766) (West); see State by State Legislative
Status, BENEFIT CORP INFO. CTR., http://benefitcorp.net/state-by-state-legislative-status (last
visited Feb. 2, 2013).
12
Legislation introduced in North Carolina, Michigan, Washington D.C., and Colorado.
State by State Legislative Status, supra note 11.
13
What Is a B Corp?, supra note 7.
14
See generally Michael D. Gottesman, From Cobblestones to Pavement: The Legal
Road Forward for the Creation of Hybrid Social Organizations, 26 YALE L. & POL’Y REV.
345 (2007); Janet Mahon, Joint Ventures Between Non-Profit and For-Profit Organizations
St. David’s Case—Worthy Destination, but Road Under Construction, 56 TAX LAW. 845
(2003); Thomas J. Billitteri, Mixing Mission and Business: Does Social Enterprise Need
a New Legal Approach? Highlights from an Aspen Institute Roundtable (Aspen Inst.,
Working Paper, Jan. 2007), available at http://www.fourthsector.net/attachments/15/original
/New_Legal_Forms_Report_FINAL.pdf?1229660976.
15
Clark & Babson, supra note 1, at 825–28 (“A business corporation is organized and
carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to
be employed for that end. The discretion of directors is to be exercised in the choice of
means to attain that end, and does not extend to a change in the end itself, to the reduction
of profits, or to the nondistribution of profits among stockholders in order to devote them
to other purposes.” (quoting Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919)));
see also Ashley Schoenjahn, New Faces of Corporate Responsibility: Will New Entity
Forms Allow Businesses to Do Good?, 37 J. CORP. L., 453, 454–57 (2012).
16
Clark & Babson, supra note 1, at 831–32 (“Without clear authority explicitly permitting directors to pursue both profit and a company’s mission, [ ] directors of missiondriven companies ... may be hesitant to ‘consider’ their missions for fear of a fiduciary
duty breach.”).
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want to do good, but corporate law, and the assumptions within corporate
law, are set up for businesses whose goals are primarily, if not entirely,
profit oriented.17 As creators of businesses challenge the concept that businesses are solely for-profit entities, and accept the view that businesses
should, or can,18 “do good,” the laws governing these entities must shift as
well. Fourth sector corporations looking to create actual social benefit
must find a way to do so in a way that does not violate their duty to shareholders and that allows for social impact to be put ahead of profits.19 Businesses looking to enter the fourth sector want to operate in a way such that
they further social goals and such that un-likeminded investors or changes
in ownership will not threaten their businesses’ social mission.20 Benefit
corporations solve some of the challenges facing the fourth sector by eliminating the risk of liability for making decisions that benefit social and environmental purposes over the financial interests of shareholders.21 This
helps to give benefit corporations protection under corporate law theories.
The benefit corporation is not the only innovation in corporate structuring that has been proposed to fix this fiduciary problem, but it is the
first state-enacted legislation aimed at doing so for corporations.22 Some
states have similarly adjusted laws for Limited Liability Companies (LLCs)
and the 1996 Uniform Limited Liability Company Act allows LLCs to be
organized for any legal purpose regardless of whether it is for profit.23 The
17

See LYNN A. STOUT, THE PROBLEM OF CORPORATE PURPOSE, 48 ISSUES IN GOVERNANCE
STUD. 1 (June 2012).
18
See generally Julie A. Nelson, Does Profit-Seeking Rule Out Love? Evidence (or Not)
from Economics and Law, 35 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 69 (2011).
19
Schoenjahn, supra note 15, at 465 (“One of the purposes of the B Corporation is to
circumnavigate the shareholder primacy norm that keeps traditional corporations from
pursuing social motives over profit maximization.”).
20
See Clark & Babson, supra note 1, at 826–28 (discussing how the owners of craigslist
wanted to create a rights plan to maintain the culture and “community service roots” but
“the court noted that the adoption of the rights plan was not reasonably related to the promotion of stockholder value,” and that the owners had “fail[ed] to prove that craigslist’s
culture translates into increased profitability for stockholders.”); see also Schoenjahn,
supra note 15, at 466 (suggesting that the classic example of Ben & Jerry’s having to sacrifice the company’s social culture to sell to the highest bidder could have been avoided if
Ben & Jerry’s had been a Benefit Corporation); Deskins, supra note 2, at 1060–61 (also
discussing the Ben & Jerry’s anecdote).
21
See Schoenjahn, supra note 15, at 458–59.
22
See William H. Clark & Larry Vranka, The Need and Rationale for the Benefit Corporation: Why It Is the Legal Form That Best Addresses the Needs of Social Entrepreneurs,
Investors, and, Ultimately, the Public, App. C, BENEFIT CORP INFORMATION CENTER, available
at http://benefitcorp.net/for-attorneys/benefit-corp-white-paper (last visited Feb. 2, 2013).
23
See David S. Walker, Consideration of an LLC for a 501(c)(3) Nonprofit Organization,
38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 627 (2012); RULLCA § 104(b) (2006); see also Brewer, supra
note 1, at 680.
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flexibility of an LLC has led to the L3C, Limited Liability Low-Profit
Company, which combines the legal structure of an LLC and the social
mission of a non-profit.24 Other businesses achieve protection from this
fiduciary duty liability through hybrid forms created by manipulating existing structures, or by working around these structures.25 As more business entities allow purposes that are not profit-motivated, attention is
drawn to what some say is an outdated assumption in corporate law.26
Being a state-recognized entity is powerful for protecting against liability for managers’ decisions, but proponents of the fourth sector see a second
issue: taxation.27 Choice-of-entity decisions revolve around the two issues
of liability and taxation. Choosing to become a benefit corporations is no
exception.28 Because benefit corporations serve the same social purposes
originally thought to be exclusively served by tax-exempt non-profits, the
question becomes: should these entities enjoy the same tax exemptions as
non-profits?29 Because benefit corporations are at least partially profit motivated, it is unlikely that benefit corporations will be granted the exact
same tax-exempt status as 501(c)(3) non-profits.30 Rather than seeking
preferential tax treatment on the entity level as an exempt organization, it
may be more attainable for benefit corporations to receive preferential treatment from the Internal Revenue Code (Code) for the activities carried out
that liken them to non-profits.31 This preferential tax treatment would positively serve benefit corporations and incentivize social responsibility in
businesses.32 This Note will suggest that the Code’s view of an entity’s
status under the Code as non-profit or for-profit clouds the true color and
correct nature of a for-profit’s activities, and that the Code’s failure to adjust
its view of business purpose at the same pace as corporate theory, creates
complications and contradictions within the Code. This Note will address
how having a state-incorporated purpose to create a social benefit in addition
to a purpose of profit generation potentially affects the tax treatment of benefit corporations, because the Code determines its treatment of an entity’s
24

See Schoenjahn, supra note 15, 460–61.
Brewer, supra note 1, at 685 (“It is possible ... to create a structure that makes use
of multiple organizations acting in concert to achieve the goal of blending philanthropic
and private dollars to fund a social enterprise.”).
26
Clark & Babson, supra note 1, at 825.
27
Brewer, supra note 1, at 684.
28
Schoenjahn, supra note 15, at 458.
29
Malani & Posner, supra note 9, at 10–11.
30
Id.
31
See generally Walker, supra note 23, at 646–49.
32
Schoenjahn, supra note 15, at 463 (discussing Bill Gates’s idea of a “creative capitalism” and how the prospect of profits could incentivize companies to do good).
25
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individual transactions and activities with consideration of the entity’s
purpose for those transactions.
In some cases, the social benefit created by socially oriented businesses
is similar, if not equivalent, to the social benefit created by 501(c)(3)s.
501(c)(3)s are exempt from federal income tax because the purpose of the
entity, and the purpose of the entity’s activities, is to create social benefit.33 Although there is a hard line drawn between 501(c)(3)s and for-profit
corporations at the entity level for classification purposes, the Code ultimately looks at the behavior of the entity in light of its classification. The
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) treats the creation of social benefit, or “good
behavior,” favorably throughout the Code and associated Regulations and,
treats solely profit-motivated activities (even of tax-exempt entities) unfavorably.34 The IRS closely considers the purpose of a business entity, along
with the purpose of the business activity, when determining its tax treatment.35 For the Code to remain consistent, benefit corporations should receive more favorable tax treatment for their socially beneficial activities
than non-benefit corporations who engage in corporate philanthropy.
I. SHIFT IN BUSINESS PURPOSE OF FOR-PROFITS
Businesses are already operating in socially responsible ways. Some
argue that the risks directors face by setting social objectives instead of
pursuing profit maximization are existent but unenforceable.36 New forms
of business, such as the benefit corporation, that want to change the purpose for which they are organized face a greater degree of risk and third
party expectation than for-profits participating in only occasional social
activities.37 This is especially true as some consumers wish to require businesses to act responsibly, and are unsatisfied with the consolation that businesses are at least now allowed to act responsibly.38 With the increase of
access to information, consumers are demanding more transparency from
businesses and holding them accountable for their actions.39 Partly in response to consumer pressures, and partly due to the aspirations of social
entrepreneurs, the fourth sector “integrates social purposes with business
methods ... [unified by] a motivation to make the world a better place.”40
33

26 U.S.C. § 501 (2012).
See infra Part II.A.
35
See infra Parts III, IV.
36
Munch, supra note 6, at 177–78.
37
Id. at 179.
38
Deskins, supra note 2, at 1074.
39
SABETI, supra note 4, at 1.
40
Id.
34
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The existing structures of each sector confine the functionality of businesses, and the fourth sector seeks to create a new space where an entity’s
impact is not limited by existing law.41 Non-profits generally have limited
access to capital, as they cannot conduct activity solely for creating profit.42
For-profits have a duty to act in the financial interest of shareholders, and by
definition are created to make a profit.43 This leaves those who would like
both to make a profit and to do good in unclear territory with an unclear
legal structure for their business.
As well established in Dodge v. Ford44 and reinforced in Revlon,45 managers could be found in breach of their fiduciary duties to shareholders if
they chose to pursue social benefit in place of shareholder wealth maximization. Corporate law “has established profit-maximization as a default
rule”46 and supports the notion that a corporation must act in the financial
interest of its shareholders. This is a problem for the fourth sector which,
at least sometimes, wishes to do the “right thing” rather than the most
profitable thing. The directors and officers of a corporation that act against
the financial interest of its shareholders are left vulnerable to shareholder
lawsuits for breach of fiduciary duty.47 Shareholder action is not the only
vulnerability to which corporations are exposed if they desire to serve a
social purpose.
All corporations are required to declare an incorporated purpose in
their articles of incorporation filed with their chosen state.48 For a nonbenefit corporation the incorporated purpose will most likely state a purpose similar to “all legal ways of making a profit.”49 Taking money out of
profits to give to charities goes against the listed incorporated purpose of a
for-profit corporation.50 At one time, a corporation giving money to charity
41

Billitteri, supra note 14, at 2 (“This new generation of hybrid organizations is taking
root in a fertile space between the corporate world, which is constrained by its duty to
generate profits for shareholders, and the nonprofit world, which often lacks the market
efficiencies of commercial enterprise.”).
42
See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c).
43
Dana Brakman Reiser, Benefit Corporations—A Sustainable Form of Organization?,
46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 591, 591 (2011).
44
Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919).
45
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986)
(allowing consideration of non-shareholder constituency during hostile takeover, only
where the constituency “rationally related benefits accruing to the stockholders”).
46
Gottesman, supra note 14, at 357.
47
Mickels, supra note 9, at 282.
48
See 1 CORP. FORMS § 2:1 (2012 ed.).
49
See Barnali Choudhury, Serving Two Masters: Incorporating Social Responsibility
into the Corporate Paradigm, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 631 (2009).
50
See 2 FLETCHER CORP. FORMS § 8:18 (5th ed.).
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was considered a breach of its contract with the state.51 Before Congress
passed legislation allowing tax deductions for charitable donations, charitable giving was considered ultra vires, and even remained ultra vires in many
states after the federal legislation was passed.52 While this is no longer the
case and a corporation can now freely donate to charities without violating
its incorporated purpose (subject to a ten percent limitation),53 charitable
giving is an exception, not a relaxing, of the treatment of fiduciary duty.
Corporate law views profit making, and the distribution of those profits, as
the primary purpose of a corporation.54 By passing legislation, charitable
donations are no longer ultra vires, but other behavior that lessens a corporation’s profits risks being categorized as a breach of fiduciary duty or
break of promise with the state.
By passing benefit corporation legislation, the fourth sector seeks to
legalize a second and equal incorporated purpose of a business in addition
to profit making: the creation of social benefit.55 Benefit corporation legislation aims to legalize the “stakeholder” model for corporations, which will
in turn affect the legal standards for fiduciary duty and state-incorporate
purpose inquiries.56 At the heart of the “stakeholder” model is the desire to
expand the duty of a corporation beyond shareholders to individuals, communities, and entities that are impacted, and to expand the actions of corporations beyond purely profit generating actions.57 As mentioned briefly
before, there have been a number of forms that businesses and advocates
have chosen as possible model forms for achieving social purpose goals
and solving issues of fiduciary duty.58 Some suggest resolving this challenge by choosing other entity structures, such as LLCs, that have more
flexible and alternative default rules;59 hybrid business forms, such as the
Low-Profit Limited Liability Corporation (L3C);60 or joint operations of
for- and non-profits.61
51

See 1 CORP. FORMS § 10:61 (2012 ed.).
Linda Sugin, Theories of the Corporation and the Tax Treatment of Corporate
Philanthropy, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 835, 857 (1997); see also Nancy J. Knauer, The
Paradox of Corporate Giving: Tax Expenditures, the Nature of the Corporation, and the
Social Construction of the Charity, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 8 (1994).
53
26 U.S.C. § 170.
54
See Choudhury, supra note 49, at 635.
55
Schoenjahn, supra note 15, at 460.
56
See supra notes 74–79 and accompanying text.
57
Gottesman, supra note 14, at 357; see also Katz & Page, supra note 1, at 59, 62.
58
See supra Introduction.
59
See generally Walker, supra note 23.
60
Brewer, supra note 1, at 681–82.
61
See Schoenjahn, supra note 15, at 459–60.
52
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Another option is to contract around the default rules, most commonly
by constituency statutes.62 Constituency statutes are allowed and recognized in just over half of the states,63 and they permit corporations to add
stakeholder interests to their articles of incorporation.64 This allows the
corporation to serve a social purpose in addition to a profit-maximizing
purpose and would eliminate the problem of socially motivated activities
being considered ultra vires. However, the extent to which constituency
statements allow for a true stakeholder model is not without criticism. For
one, constituency statements only make it permissible to act for a nonprofit-maximizing purpose, they do not require a company to do good.65
Another criticism is that some constituency statements narrowly define
stakeholders only as the immediately surrounding parties such as employees
and customers but leave out larger stakeholders such as “the environment,
the international community, or human rights.”66 Another criticism is that
even though these constituency statutes allow the stakeholder interests to
be added to the articles of incorporation, there has been no court ruling on
whether the constituency statutes can be legally enforced.67 Case law has
disallowed “commitments beyond profit maximization” when the purposes
have not been added to the articles of incorporation, but there is no ruling
that considers when they have been added.68 Essentially, constituency statutes allow organizations to state their purpose, but it is still legally uncertain
that corporations are able to carry it out.69
Benefit corporation legislation improves upon many of the inadequacies of constituency statutes. While the legislation in each of these states
varies slightly,70 the legal framework of each state is greatly influenced by
the legal framework given by B Lab:
62

See Gottesman, supra note 14, at 357; see also Katz & Page, supra note 1, at 92;
see generally Clark & Babson, supra note 1, at 828–34; Munch, supra note 6, at 180–83.
63
See Clark & Babson, supra note 1, at 830–31 nn.64–66 and accompanying text.
Notably, of the states that have passed benefit corporation legislation, California is the
only state not to have recognized constituency statutes prior to passing the benefit corporation legislation. Id. at 818 n.1, 830 n.64.
64
See Gottesman, supra note 14, at 357.
65
Clark & Babson, supra note 1, at 832 (“[D]irectors have the permission not to
consider interests other than shareholder maximization of value.”).
66
Munch, supra note 6, at 181.
67
See Gottesman, supra note 14, at 357.
68
Id. at 356–57.
69
Clark & Babson, supra note 1, at 831–32 (“Without clear authority ... even directors
of mission-driven companies in constituency statute jurisdictions may be hesitant to ‘consider’
their missions for fear of a fiduciary duty breach.”). See Legal FAQs, BENEFIT CORP
INFO. CTR., http://www.benefitcorp.net/for-attorneys/legal-faqs (last visited Feb. 2, 2013).
70
See Clark & Babson, supra note 1, at 838.
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Objective: Expand the responsibilities of the corporation to include consideration of the interests of employees, consumers, the community, and
the environment. Give legal permission and protection to officers and
directors to consider all stakeholders, not just shareholders. Create additional rights for shareholders to hold directors and officers accountable to these interests. Limit these expanded rights to shareholders
exclusively—non-shareholders are explicitly not empowered with a
new right of action.71

Benefit corporations are a clear improvement upon constituency statements if the main concern is requiring businesses to act responsibly, as
benefit corporations are not just permitted, but required to serve a social
purpose.72 Benefit corporation legislation also expands the stakeholders
whose interests the corporation can consider by requiring benefit corporations to include a general public benefit as an incorporated purpose, and
by allowing for a specific public benefit.73
The goal of benefit corporations is to solve the fiduciary duty problem
in the simplest way possible. Two aspects are important to finding a simple
solution. The first is including the stakeholder model in its articles of incorporation74 and the second is making the entity legitimate under the state
law by passing legislation that recognizes this distinct entity’s ability to
include the stakeholder model in its articles.75 This is an important distinction and can be demonstrated by examining the difference between benefit
corporations created by state legislation and Certified B Corps certified by
B Labs.76 In many ways, Certified B Corps function like extreme constituency statements.77 A B Corp’s articles of incorporation may be identical to
71

The Legal Framework, B LAB, http://www.bcorporation.net/become/legal (accessed
by searching the Internet Archive index for Oct. 3, 2012).
72
See Guidance: Considering Stakeholder Interests, BENEFIT CORP INFO. CTR., http://
www.benefitcorp.net/for-directors/guidance-considering-stakeholder-interests (last visited
Feb. 2, 2013).
73
See Clark & Babson, supra note 1, at 839–42 (“This definition takes a holistic approach and is meant to be both comprehensive and flexible.”).
74
See Deskins, supra note 2, at 1061.
75
See Munch, supra note 6, at 184.
76
See Benefit Corp Legislation, B LAB, http://www.bcorporation.net/publicpolicy
(accessed by searching the Internet Archive Index for Oct. 3, 2012) (“Both are sometimes
called B Corps. They share much in common and have a few important differences. Certified
B Corporation is a certification conferred by the non-profit B Lab. Benefit corporation is
a legal status administered by the state. Benefit corporations do NOT need to be certified.
Certified B Corporations have been certified as having met a high standard of overall social and environmental performance, and as a result have access to a portfolio of services
and support from B Lab that benefit corporations do not.”).
77
See Emily Chan, What It Means to Be a “B”: B Corp v. Benefit Corporation, LAW
FOR CHANGE BLOG (Mar. 19, 2012), http://www.lawforchange.org/NewsBot.asp?MODE
=VIEW&ID=5220; Munch, supra note 6, at 182.
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a benefit corporation’s, but without state legislation recognizing the entity,
the articles of incorporation act more like a constituency statement akin to
a contract with the shareholders.78 The state legislation creating the benefit
corporation as a choice of entity recognizes the articles of incorporation as
a contract with the state.79 State recognition as a legal form of entity provides the benefit corporation protection and certainty under its laws.
A B Lab certified B Corp is not a recognized business entity existing
under state law, but a certification.80 B Labs is a third-party certifier of
benefit corporations and has spearheaded the effort to get states to adopt
its model legislation.81 Any business can become certified as a B Corp by
taking the “B Impact Test” and scoring a minimum of 80 out of 200 available points.82 The business must then “adopt the B Corporation Legal
Framework to bake the mission of the company into its legal DNA,”83
which is essentially “retrofitting”84 the corporation to include the stakeholder model in its articles of incorporation. The B Corp must also “sign a
Term Sheet and Declaration of Interdependence” to make the certification
official.85 Each year, B Lab randomly selects ten percent of the current B
Corps to audit and will adjust a B Corp’s score according to the audit, removing its certification if it no longer qualifies.86 Certification of a B Corp
is similar to certifications such as Fair Trade or LEED, and B Lab serves
the same purpose as Transfair and USGBC respectively.87 Certification as
a B Corp certainly adds legitimacy to the business’s socially conscious
efforts in the eyes of investors and consumers. However, eliminating risk
to directors through legitimacy under the law is essential for social entrepreneurs to form these socially responsible businesses, even if certification
will help skeptics find their intentions believable.88 Accordingly, although
78

See Chan, supra note 77; Munch, supra note 6, at 182.
See Chan, supra note 77; Munch, supra note 6, at 182.
80
See Benefit Corp Legislation, supra note 76.
81
See The Benefit Corporation: A New Trend in Social Entrepreneurship, FIRST VENTURE
LEGAL BLOG (Dec. 21, 2011), http://www.firstventurelegal.com/the-benefit-corporation-a
-new-trend-in-social-entrepreneurship/.
82
See B Corp Certification Overview, B LAB, http://www.bcorporation.net/Certification
-Overview (accessed by searching the Internet Archive index for Oct. 3, 2012).
83
Id.
84
Munch, supra note 6, at 183.
85
Make It Official, B LAB, http://www.bcorporation.net/become/official (accessed by
searching the Internet Archive index for Oct. 3, 2012).
86
Become a B Corp, B LAB, http://www.bcorporation.net/become/BRS (accessed by
searching the Internet Archive for Oct. 3, 2012).
87
See What Is a B Corp, supra note 7; Brewer, supra note 1, at 683.
88
See Clark & Babson, supra note 1, at 824 (“[E]ntrepreneurs that are ‘sustainable,’
‘green,’ or ‘socially responsible’ may find that it is hard to distinguish themselves from
other companies that make similar claims, but do not actually behave as they advertise.”).
79
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the B Corp certification process adds accountability to those businesses
that pass the test, a certified B Corp that does not live up to its purpose
will lose its certification, while an incorporated benefit corporation that
does not live up to its purpose could face legal consequences.89
Only twelve states have enacted legislation creating benefit corporations as a separate legal entity. The first was Maryland in April of 2010.90
Vermont, New Jersey, Virginia, Hawaii, California, New York, Louisiana,
Massachusetts, Illinois, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina followed.91 California is of particular significance because, prior to this legislation, its law
did not allow constituency statements or the creative, hybrid forms of business used by the fourth sector to lessen the fiduciary duty in a manner that
would allow directors to pursue non-profit-maximizing or socially oriented purposes.92 This means that California law would enforce the profitmaximization standard for fiduciary duty even if the corporation had included a stakeholder model in its articles of incorporation.93 Additionally,
California passed two separate legal entity forms, the Benefit Corporation
and the Flexible Purpose Corporation (Flex C); the Benefit Corporation is
incorporated for a general social purpose in addition to profit making, and
the Flex C is incorporated for an additional specific social purpose.94 The
model legislation for benefit corporations allows for an optional specific
purpose in addition to the general purpose.95 The distinction between a
general and specific purpose and how that might affect the tax treatment of
the entity is discussed further.
An example showing another difference between a certified B Corp
and an incorporated benefit corporation is that the City of Philadelphia
gave a sustainable business tax credit to Certified B Corps96 before it
89

See Chan, supra note 77.
See Maryland First State in Union to Pass Benefit Corporation Legislation, THE
CORP. SOC. RESP. NEWSWIRE (Apr. 14, 2010), http://www.csrwire.com/press_releases
/29332-Maryland-First-State-in-Union-to-Pass-Benefit-Corporation-Legislation.
91
See State by State Legislative Status, supra note 11. At the time of writing, there is
also pending legislation in Washington, D.C. Id.
92
See The New ABC’s of California Corporations, KAYE & MILLS, http://www.kayemills
.com/articles/new-abcs-of-california-corporations.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2013).
93
Id.
94
Id.; see Sheila Shayon, California Law Creates New “Flexible Purpose” Category
of Positive Impact Corporation, BRANDCHANNEL (Oct. 17, 2011, 11:07 AM), http://www
.brandchannel.com/home/post/2011/10/17/California-Law-Creates-New-Category-of-Positive
-Impact-Corporation.aspx.
95
MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 201(b) (2007).
96
See Leslie Potter, First U.S. Sustainable-Business Tax Incentive, URBAN FARM,
http://www.urbanfarmonline.com/sustainable-living/urban-community-building/philly-tax-in
centives.aspx (last visited Feb. 2, 2013).
90
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passed benefit corporation legislation. Therefore, as far as choice of entity
is concerned, a B Corp could not file as a benefit corporation with the
State of Pennsylvania and thus recognize the benefit of protection by its
laws, but a B Corp would still have enjoyed some benefits based on its
recognition as a certified business.
States give businesses permission to operate and exist within a state’s
borders.97 While there are model or uniform acts that often govern the default rules for the existence and operation of business entities such as partnerships, LLCs, and corporations, it is ultimately up to the state to decide
the laws regarding choice of entity and those entities’ operations.98 By
passing legislation that introduces the benefit corporation as a new choice
of entity available for businesses in that state, benefit corporations are made
a legal entity distinct from other corporations and a new area of law under
which the new entity will operate is created. This is relevant because the
state law in which the business is incorporated or registered under dictates
what fiduciary laws apply, and that state’s law is also used to help determine what type of entity the business is for federal income tax purposes.99
The fact that benefit corporations are a legally recognized entity for
doing business under state law is not only important for understanding the
significant role that they play in shifting the definition of business purpose,100 but also for the arguments brought forth in this Note regarding the
Code’s treatment of a benefit corporation. The policy and theoretical debates over whether a corporation’s purpose inherently involves social responsibility, or whether it is strictly profit-maximizing, existed well before
states began legitimizing benefit corporations in 2010.101 The debate that
critics and advocates have over fiduciary duty is the same debate regarding the allowance of charitable contributions.102 Although the support for
benefit corporations reflects a desire to change the assumption that all corporations are strictly profit-maximizing entities, it does not necessarily
indicate that the change has occurred. In a way, benefit corporations create
a refuge for corporations that want to escape the uncertainty of liability for
their socially oriented, wealth-reducing activities, but the uncertainty still
remains for non-benefit corporations. Benefit corporations legally shifted
97

See JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS
§ 1:2 (3d ed. 2011).
98
See id. § 3:2.
99
See id.
100
Munch, supra note 6, at 184 (“A new form would lend needed certainty and legitimacy to the benefit corporation project.”).
101
See generally Knauer, supra note 52.
102
See supra Part I.
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their own purpose, but they have not necessarily shifted the theoretical
view of corporations as a whole.103 In general, the questions that this Note
addresses are whether having a state-incorporated social purpose removes
the profit-maximizing assumption for benefit corporations in regard to fiduciary duty, and whether the removal of that assumption does, or should,
have any effect on the Code’s view and treatment of benefit corporations.
II. WHY INCORPORATED BENEFIT CORPORATIONS ARE A SPECIAL
BLEND OF FOR-PROFIT AND NON-PROFIT
Benefit corporations may be best examined under the Code by viewing
benefit corporations as now having two dual purposes, one to make profits104
and the other to serve social goals105 (for the purposes of this Note, “make
benefit”), rather than as an adjustment of the definition of a corporation.
This accurately demonstrates the hurdle presented by the Code over which
the benefit corporation is currently straddled. Tax-exempt 501(c) and 501(d)
organizations are exempt from federal income taxes based on whether they
are organized and operated exclusively for one of the listed approved purposes.106 Specifically, the exclusively organized test is met by examining
the purposes listed in a corporation’s Articles of Organization.107 This correlation between the importance of a non-profit’s incorporated purposes
and the benefit corporation’s incorporated purposes is what makes the benefit corporation more significant than constituency statements and Certified
B Corps.108 While benefit corporations are not exclusively organized and
operated for any of the listed purposes, B Corps now make it possible for a
103

For the remainder of this Note, where a shift in business purpose is discussed
either as a trend or the legal change in purpose for Benefit Corporations, it is mostly used
in reference to the fact that States are now allowing and legitimizing the option to have a
social purpose.
104
See Halle Tecco, Not For-Profit, Not Non-Profit, but Somewhere in Between,
HUFFPOST IMPACT (Jan. 4, 2010, 7:05 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/halle-tecco
/not-for-profit-not-non-pr_b_411117.html.
105
See id.
106
See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b).
107
See id. “An organization is not organized exclusively for one or more exempt
purposes if its articles expressly empower it to carry on, otherwise than as an insubstantial part of its activities, activities which are not in furtherance of one or more exempt
purposes, even though such organization is, by the terms of such articles, created for a purpose that is no broader than the purposes specified in section 501(c)(3).” § 1.501(c)(3)1(b)(2)(b)(iii).
108
Even though certified B Corps must amend their articles to include a general public benefit in order to be certified by B Labs, it is the state acknowledged and authorized
aspect of the incorporated purpose that gives it more certain legal significance. See Legal
Requirement, B LAB, http://www.bcorporation.net/become/legal (last visited Feb. 2, 2013).

284

WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 4:269

tax-exempt approved purpose to be one of the state-recognized incorporated purposes of a taxable entity.109 The fact that B Corps now have explicit, although not exclusive, social purposes, and may be held liable for
not acting in the interest of those purposes, raises questions regarding
whether B Corps should receive the same, or similar, tax treatment as taxexempt entities.
Benefit corporations have broken the rigid, single profit-seeking entity
view for fiduciary duty and corporate law that has been evolving and
growing over the years.110 The Code, however, has not undergone the same
evolutionary process and remains quite rigid.111 The for-profit corporate
law default rules and assumptions create an “unbridgeable chasm between
for-profit enterprise and the charitable world,”112 and while that gap is
filled for fiduciary duties in benefit corporations, “[e]verybody thinks with
their brain in a left-right axis, and it’s divided by the tax code.”113 An entity
is placed into its respective half of the Code according to the purpose for
which that entity was organized.114 If the entity was organized and created
to make money, then it is taxable.115 If the entity was organized for the purpose of working toward a “social” mission, then it is tax-exempt.116 Benefit
corporations challenge the Code’s current categorization of entities because they are legally recognized as being incorporated for both purposes.
Tax preferences are not an explicit goal of benefit corporations, but it
is something that representatives of B Labs117 and other fourth sector speculators are hoping will happen one day.118 The new legislation passed by
states has no impact on the tax status of the organizations.119 The Model
109

See In Defense of Tax Incentives: A Response to Diana Aviv, President Independent
Sector, B Lab, http://blog.bcorporation.net/2010/06/in-defense-of-tax-incentives-a-response
-to-diana-aviv-president-independent-sector/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2013).
110
See Sugin, supra note 52, at 837.
111
Id.
112
Billitteri, supra note 14, at 7.
113
Id. (comments of Mr. R. Todd Johnson).
114
See Business Taxes, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Small-Businesses-&-Self
-Employed/Business-Taxes (last visited Feb. 2, 2013).
115
See Corporations, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Small-Businesses-&-Self
-Employed/Corporations (last visited Feb. 2, 2013).
116
See Exemption Requirements-Section 501(c)(3) Organizations, IRS, http://www.irs
.gov/Charities-&-Non-Profits/Charitable-Organizations/Exemption-Requirements-Section
-501%28c%29%283%29-Organizations (last visited Feb. 2, 2013).
117
See Schoenjahn, supra note 15, at 458; Jack B. Siegel, Esq., B Corporations: A
New Form of Business Entity, or Just an Exercise in Branding?, 2011 Emerging Issues
5757, 6 LEXISNEXIS (July 7, 2011); see also Billitteri, supra note 14, at 12.
118
See Gottesman, supra note 14, at 355–58.
119
See Business FAQ’s, supra note 8.
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Legislation for benefit corporations cites to another subdivision under the
same title that determines the applicable law for all matters not addressed
in the chapter—applicable tax treatment, for example.120 This other subdivision is usually the subdivision that determines general corporation law.
The Code is so rigid in how it views the capacity of each side to “do
good” that it only acknowledges “good” done by for-profits in the form of
charitable contributions to IRS acknowledged tax-exempt entities.121 The
donation must be to an organization the IRS has qualified as a “good doing”
organization, or it will not be recognized as a charitable contribution.122
While the Code is often used to incentivize or disincentivize behavior, and
this is certainly the case with charitable contributions and at least some of
the justification for tax-exempt status,123 non-profits are exempt from taxes
for reasons other than the fact that the Code wants to cut them a break.124
A. The Internal Revenue Code Favors Good Behavior and Taxes
Profit-Motivated Income
The Code ultimately makes the divide that qualifying non-profits will
be exempt from federal income tax and for-profit corporations will have
their income taxed.125 Tax-exempt status earns qualifying organizations
exemption from federal income tax and some other taxes, but not all taxes.126
Both non-profits and for-profits earn income, and in fact, both non-profits
and for-profits may generate profits. The difference between the incomes
and profits is seen when expanding non-profits to their full name: not-forprofits. As mentioned, this reflects that the manner by which the Code categorizes taxable and tax-exempt entities is by their purposes.127 The income

120

MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 101(c) (2012).
See Charitable Donation Tax Deductions, BETTER BUS. BUREAU, http://www.bbb
.org/us/Charity-Tax-Deductions/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2012).
122
See I.R.S. Publ’n 526, Charitable Contributions (2011), available at http://www
.irs.gov/publications/p526/ar02.html#en_US_2011_publink1000229641.
123
See Sweetened Charity, THE ECONOMIST (June 9, 2012), http://www.economist
.com/node/21556570.
124
See Terri Lynn Helge, The Taxation of Cause-Related Marketing, 85 CHI.–KENT
L. REV. 883, 886 (2010).
125
See 26 U.S.C. § 501(a).
126
Tax Exempt & Government Entities Division At-a-Glance, IRS, http://www.irs
.gov/uac/Tax-Exempt-&-Government-Entities-Division-At-a-Glance (last updated Sept. 5,
2012) (tax exempt and government entities “[p]ay more than $220 billion in employment
tax and income tax withholding”); see also Brewer, supra note 1, 694 nn.58–60 and
accompanying text.
127
See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(a)(2).
121
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generated by tax-exempt entities is not intended to be profits,128 while the
income generated by for-profit entities is intended to become profits.129
The income that an exempt organization earns is assumed and required
to be spent on serving the charitable purpose for which the entity was organized.130 Alternatively, the IRS views a for-profit corporation as a “profitmaximizing” entity131 that generates income with the intent of retaining a
portion of that income as profits to be distributed for the private benefit for
its shareholders. Tax-exempt entities do not generate income for the purpose of creating profits for private benefit or for generating profits at all
(to the extent that they are inclined to spend all of their income that would
be profits). A tax-exempt entity generates income to pay for the expenses
necessary to provide a public benefit, and may lose its tax-exempt status if
it distributes its income for a private benefit.132
As a way to apply the federal income tax only to income motivated by
the prospect of creating a profit (profit-motivated income), the Code defines
and divides entities according to the entity’s intention, or reason, for generating income.133 Understanding what type of income the IRS wants to
capture under the federal income tax is only one side of the story; there are
also reasons the IRS wants to exempt a non-profit’s income (as opposed to a
lack of desire to tax it).134 The IRS “wants” the non-profit to work toward
its social mission, and taxing the income that it would otherwise spend on
achieving that goal is counterproductive. The sector of the IRS that monitors non-profits “is not designed to generate revenue, but rather to ensure
that the entities fulfill the policy goals that their tax exemption was designed to achieve.”135 The Unrelated Business Income Tax (UBIT) is further
evidence that the IRS wants to ensure that non-profits achieve their policy
goals. The UBIT is a tax placed on income generated by a non-profit
through activities that are unrelated to the non-profit’s stated purpose.136
128

See Non Profit Organizations, JUSTIA.COM, http://www.justia.com/business-formation
/non-profit-organizations/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2013).
129
See Joshua Kennon, Operating Income and Operating Profit Margin, ABOUT.COM,
http://beginnersinvest.about.com/od/incomestatementanalysis/a/operating-income-operating
-margin.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2013).
130
See § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1).
131
Sugin, supra note 52, at 836.
132
I.R.S. Publ’n 4220, Applying for 501(c)(3) Tax-Exempt Status (Rev. Aug. 2009), http://
www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p4220.pdf.
133
Walker, supra note 23, at 630.
134
See Helge, supra note 124.
135
Charles P. Rettig, At-a-Glance: The Internal Revenue Service, Its Mission and Function,
8 J. TAX PRAC. & PROC. 47, 52 (2006).
136
I.R.S. Publ’n 598, Tax on Unrelated Business Income of Exempt Organizations
(Rev. Mar. 2012), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p598.pdf.
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This, together with the concept that the IRS chooses to capture profitmotivated income, supports the notion that the IRS wants to encourage
and incentivize “good” behavior, not just give preferential tax treatment to
organizations based on their status or entity-categorization alone.
III. BENEFICIAL TREATMENT UNDER THE CODE
A. Tax-Exempt Status
The Code divides qualified tax-exempt organizations into groups determined by the purposes of the organization.137 The group of tax-exempt organizations most applicable to a discussion of tax treatment for benefit corporations is the 501(c)(3) public charities because the purposes of the benefit
corporation are closely related to the purposes allowed for 501(c)(3)s.138
501(c)(3) public charities are also the most common 501(c) organization
and account for fifty-nine percent of reporting tax-exempt organizations139
and total more than 1.2 million organizations.140 The 501(c)(3)-listed purposes are “religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary,
or educational purposes, or to foster national or international amateur sports
competition ..., or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals.”141
The “charitable” purpose has been interpreted broadly and will accommodate non-profits seeking tax-exempt status that do not fit the more specific
purposes listed.142 A portion of the definition of “charity” includes:
[r]elief of the poor and distressed or of the underprivileged; advancement
of religion; advancement of education or science; erection or maintenance
of public buildings, monuments, or works; lessening of the burdens of
Government; and promotion of social welfare by organizations designed
to accomplish any of the above purposes, or (i) to lessen neighborhood
tensions; (ii) to eliminate prejudice and discrimination; (iii) to defend
human and civil rights secured by law; or (iv) to combat community
deterioration and juvenile delinquency.143

137

See 26 U.S.C. §§ 501(c)(1)–(29).
See supra Part I.
139
See Walker, supra note 23, at 628 (citing Kennard T. Wing et al., The Nonprofit
Sector in Brief: Public Charities, Giving, and Volunteering, 2010, URBAN INST. (2010)).
140
Id. at 630.
141
Id. 501(c)(3)s are also distinguished from other listed exempt organizations because they are not allowed to participate in politics (“[N]o substantial part of the activities of
which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation ..., and
which does not participate in, or intervene in ... any political campaign on behalf of ...
any candidate for public office.”). Id.
142
Walker, supra note 23, at 631.
143
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2).
138
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Many of these definitions of charity mirror the same type of activities as
those considered for the general public benefit and specific public benefit
in which benefit corporations must engage.
B. Why Give Tax-Exempt Status
The IRS website and its publications state in many places sentiments
that there are strong policy reasons as to why tax-exempt organizations
receive this tax preference. One of the reasons to give tax exemptions to
501(c)(3) qualifying organizations is found in the Treasury Regulation defining charity—“lessening of the burdens of [g]overnment.”144
A more mechanical explanation is “income measurement theory,”145
which argues that the individuals that the non-profits serve actually receive the income and that the non-profit is only a conduit through which
the funds flow.146 Therefore, the non-profits do not have income to be
taxed, and the charitable services or donations the non-profits make would
be taxable income to their recipients. The income measurement theorists
recognize the near impossibility of taxing these recipients who are often
not known at the time the non-profit performs services or spends funds,
and for this reason, it is simplest to avoid the problem by exempting qualifying non-profits from income tax.147 While avoidance might seem like a
practical solution and not a theoretical reason, an argument can also be
made that those who receive the actual benefit are typically indigent or in
a tax bracket that would receive lesser tax obligations.
As discussed before, the IRS is more interested in using taxation as a
means to monitor non-profits and ensure that they are working toward
their social purposes than it is in actually monitoring their taxation.148 Because a tax-exempt organization must be exclusively organized for a qualifying purpose,149 once a non-profit attains tax-exempt status, the assumption
will be that the organization is doing good.150 The IRS sets up limitations for
the formation and structure of non-profits151 so that it is more likely that
they will do “good,” but the IRS continues to monitor the organizations.152
144

Id.
Seong J. Kim, Note, Hiding Behind the Corporate Veil: A Guide to Non-Profit
Corporations with For-Profit Subsidiaries, 5 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 189, 194 (2009).
146
Id.
147
Id.
148
Kim, supra note 145, at 193; see generally I.R.S. Publ’n 557, Tax-Exempt Status
of Your Organization (Rev. Oct. 2011), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p557.pdf.
149
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(a)(1).
150
However, non-profits have to reapply for tax-exempt status fairly regularly. See
I.R.S. Publ’n 557, supra note 148.
151
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b) to -1(d).
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I.R.S. Publ’n 557, supra note 148.
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C. Limitations Placed on Tax-Exempt Organizations
1. Cannot Bestow Private Benefit
One particularly important limitation placed on non-profits, and an
important distinguishing feature between corporations and non-profits,153
is that non-profits cannot create profit for a private benefit, or they could
lose their exempt status.154 Corporations, including benefit corporations,
distribute their profits to their shareholders. The requirement that nonprofits cannot give private benefit is so strong that if non-profits do give a
private benefit, they could be subject to a punitive excise tax on the “excess
benefit transaction.”155 The IRS imposes this tax as a sanction when the nonprofit gives a benefit to a party undesired by the IRS but the benefit bestowed
is not so great as to disqualify the non-profit from its tax-exempt status.156
Not only must they spend their income on their public purpose, but
they must also earn their income in such a way that serves their public
purpose.157 If they earn income in a manner that is more like a for-profit
business, then they will be taxed on that income—even if they would have
(or already have) spent that income on activities that serve their social purpose.158 This is reflected in the fact that the two upmost qualifying attributes
of an exempt organization159 are exclusive organization and exclusive operation for one or more exempt purposes.160 This test can be quite strict.161
2. Exclusively Organized
A non-profit organization must be organized for one of the purposes
listed by the IRS.162 For the exclusively organized test, the IRS will disqualify
153

Walker, supra note 23, at 630–31.
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(2) (“An organization is not operated exclusively for
one or more exempt purposes if its net earnings inure in whole or in part to the benefit of
private shareholders or individuals.”).
155
Brewer, supra note 1, at 702–03; 26 U.S.C. § 4958 (2006 & Supp. 2009).
156
Brewer, supra note 1, at 702–03 (“The excise taxes ... are punitive in nature so as
to discourage certain behavior, and are imposed upon both the offending ‘disqualified
person’ and, if a knowing, willful violation occurs, management.”).
157
Walker, supra note 23, at 630–31 (citing Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii) (2011)).
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See infra note 176 and accompanying text.
159
Brewer, supra note 1, at 698–99.
160
Walker, supra note 23, at 630–31; Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(a)(1) (“In order to
be exempt as an organization described in section 501(c)(3), an organization must be both
organized and operated exclusively for one or more of the purposes specified in such
section. If an organization fails to meet either the organizational test or the operational
test, it is not exempt.”).
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See Brewer, supra note 1, at 698–702.
162
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1).
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the organization if “the terms of its articles [list] purposes for which such
organization is created [that] are broader than the [charitable] purposes
specified.”163 This means that if any non-exempt purpose is mentioned in
its articles, it will not qualify as tax-exempt.164 Stricter still, the IRS says
an organization with a purpose broader than the specified charitable purpose will not meet the exclusively organized test even if “the actual operations of such an organization have been exclusively in furtherance” of the
qualifying purposes, or if there is evidence or statements indicating the
members intend to operate in such a manner.165 Furthermore, the incorporated purpose matters so much to receiving tax-exempt status that even if
the non-profit is exclusively operated for an exempt purpose, and it just
failed to file under that purpose, the entity will not be tax-exempt.166
3. Exclusively Operated
The exclusively operated test is less sensitive, and organizations will
not necessarily lose their status for unrelated activity as long as the activity
is not substantial.167 If the organization’s unrelated activity is not insubstantial then the organization will lose its exemption.168 The exclusively
organized requirement is stricter but clearer. The substantially operated
portion, however, is where much of the IRS monitoring will come in as it
tries to determine what is “not insubstantial.”169
D. Operational Activities of Tax-Exempt Entities
1. Trade or Business
Part of the operational testing is to ensure that the non-profit does
not operate like a for-profit. If a tax-exempt entity does operate like a
163

§ 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(1)(iv); see I.R.S., The Organizational Test Under 501(c)(3), Exempt
Organization CPE Text (1985), at pt. 4, http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopicc85.pdf.
164
§ 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(1)(i), -1(b)(1)(iii), -1(b)(1)(iv); see Better Bus. Bureau v. United
States, 326 U.S. 279, 283 (1945) (“[T]he presence of a single non-exempt purpose, if
substantial in nature, will destroy the exemption regardless of the number or importance
of truly ... [exempt] purposes.”); Mahon, supra note 14, 84 n.9.
165
Supra note 163.
166
§ 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(1)(iv) to -1(b)(1)(v). I.R.S., The Organizational Test Under
501(c)(3), Exempt Organization CPE Text (1985), at pts. 3–4, http://www.irs.gov/pub
/irs-tege/eotopicc85.pdf.
167
Kim, supra note 145, at 202.
168
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1) (losing status “if more than an insubstantial part
of its activities is not in furtherance of an exempt purpose”).
169
§ 1.501(c)(3)-1(c).
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for-profit—operating a trade or business170—then the trade or business
must be in furtherance of the entity’s exempt purpose or purposes.171 In
order to determine whether the activity falls under the definition of an unrelated trade or business in § 513172 to the extent that it would jeopardize the
tax exemption on the income generated by that activity, the IRS applies a
balancing test.173 The definition of trade or business is the same for the
purposes of § 513 (unrelated trade or business), and § 162, which defines
what constitutes a trade or business for a corporation.174
In a discussion on the potential tax consequences to a tax-exempt organization of participating in an unrelated trade or business, one author wrote:
The term “trade or business” generally includes any activity carried on for
the production of income from the sale of goods or performance of services. In evaluating this criterion, courts and the Internal Revenue Service
consider whether the organization has a profit motive and whether the
organization’s activity competes with that of for-profit enterprises. In
determining whether a profit motive exists, significant weight is given to
objective factors such as whether the activity is similar to profit-making
activities conducted by commercial enterprises.175

This concept—taxing the income of a non-profit when it generated that
income by behaving like a for-profit—is referred to as Unrelated Business
Income Tax (UBIT); the income received is referred to as Unrelated Business
Income (UBI), and is taxable.176 UBIT is applicable when determining the
tax treatment of behaviors that are not related to the non-profit’s purpose.177
2. Unrelated Business Income Tax
When a non-profit participates in business activities similar to forprofits, such that they are operating in a trade or business, then the income
170

§ 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii) to -1(d)(1)(iii).
§ 1.501(c)(3)-1(e)(1) (stating that an otherwise exempt organization will not lose
its exempt status if it “operates a trade or business as a substantial part of its activities, if
the operation of such trade or business is in furtherance of the organization’s exempt purpose or purposes and if the organization is not organized or operated for the primary purpose of carrying on an unrelated trade or business”).
172
Id.
173
Id. (“In determining the existence or nonexistence of such primary purpose, all the circumstances must be considered, including the size and extent of the trade or business and the
size and extent of the activities which are in furtherance of one or more exempt purposes.”).
174
Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(b). See infra Part VI.A.
175
Helge, supra note 124, at 889 (citations omitted) (discussing 26 U.S.C. § 513(c)
(2006); Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(b) (2006)).
176
Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(a).
177
See Brewer, supra note 1, at 873–75 nn.126–35 and accompanying text.
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they receive from those activities will be taxed as UBI.178 The UBIT179
regulations were enacted as part of an equalizing measure between nonprofits and for-profits to make sure non-profits did not have a tax-free advantage on ordinary trade or business that is typically a profit driven activity
rather than one satisfying its 501(c)(3) purpose.180 Income from an activity
of the tax-exempt organization is considered unrelated and therefore taxable if it satisfies these three tests: “(i) the activity constitutes a ‘trade or
business,’ (ii) the activity is ‘regularly carried on’ by the organization, and
(iii) the conduct of the activity is ‘not substantially related to the performance of the organization’s exempt function.’”181 To qualify as UBI, the
activity must generally meet all of those requirements.182 For example,
selling books is a trade or business,183 but if a non-profit sells books it is
not necessarily taxed on the income generated.184 If the charitable purpose
of the non-profit is to benefit the environment, then income generated
from the sale of books will not be unrelated if the books are about saving
the environment, but the income generated will be unrelated if the books
are about, say, classical art.185 This demonstrates the balance of the Code
to tax all profit-motivated income, unless it was generated in the pursuit of
one of its approved social purposes.

178

26 U.S.C. § 512(a) (2006).
Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(a) (defining unrelated business taxable income as “the gross
income derived by an organization from any unrelated trade or business regularly carried
on by it .... Section 513 specifies with certain exceptions that the phrase unrelated trade
or business means ... any trade or business the conduct of which is not substantially
related ... to the exercise or performance by such organization of its charitable,
educational, or other purpose or function constituting the basis for its exemption under
section 501 ....”).
180
Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(b) (“The primary objective of adoption of the unrelated
business income tax was to eliminate a source of unfair competition by placing the
unrelated business activities of certain exempt organizations upon the same tax basis as
the nonexempt business endeavors with which they compete. On the other hand, where
an activity does not possess the characteristics of a trade or business within the meaning
of section 162 ..., the unrelated business income tax does not apply since the organization
is not in competition with taxable organizations.”).
181
Helge, supra note 124, at 897–98 (“There are other policies supporting the
enforcement of the UBIT rules besides unfair competition; however, unfair competition is
the most often touted.”).
182
Id. at 897.
183
Brewer, supra note 1, at 705 (explaining “[a] trade or business generally is defined
as any activity carried on for the ‘production of income from the sale of goods or the
performance of services’” (citing I.R.C. § 513(c) (2006); Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(b))).
184
See id. at 706.
185
Brewer, supra note 1, at 706.
179
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3. Program-Related Investment
Although not necessarily applicable to the 501(c)(3)s mainly discussed
here, private foundations are allowed to partake in Program-Related Investment (PRI),186 which is an investment of which the primary purpose
“is to accomplish one or more of the purposes described in § 170(c)(2)(B),
and no significant purpose of which is the production of income or the appreciation of property.”187 As a private foundation participating in PRI, the
foundation is making a grant-like investment in an organization or activity,
but it is still receiving some returns.188 The other side of PRI is that “[i]f a
private foundation invests any amount in such a manner as to jeopardize
the carrying out of any of its exempt purposes,” then the IRS may impose
a tax on that investment that varies between ten and twenty-five percent.189
PRI is not often used because it takes a good deal of substantiation.190
The IRS monitors PRI to make sure the private trust is engaging in the activity that the IRS approves of and is doing so in a manner of which they
also approve.191 The private foundation must engage in “expenditure responsibility.”192 This means that the private foundation must “see that the
grant is spent solely for the purpose for which made”; “obtain full and
complete reports from the grantee on how the funds are spent”; and give a
detailed report on the expenditures to the IRS.193 PRI shows how the Code
allows a non-profit to operate in a manner similar to a for-profit in a longterm manner that supports the public benefiting purpose for which it was
incorporated.194 The Code has allowed flexibilities for the realities facing
tax-exempt entities and there are many characteristics of these provisions
that could translate to benefit corporations.
IV. THE CODE’S ASSUMPTIONS REGARDING FOR-PROFITS ARE
TROUBLING FOR BENEFIT CORPORATIONS
After understanding how the Code identifies, treats, and monitors the
behaviors of non-profits, and understanding how the Code treats “good”
behavior differently from “profit-motivated” behavior, this Note now turns
186

26 U.S.C. § 4944(c) (2011).
Id.
188
Brewer, supra note 1, at 712–13.
189
26 U.S.C. § 4944(a)–(b) (2006).
190
Brewer, supra note 1, at 712.
191
Id.
192
Id. at 712; Treas. Reg. § 53.4945-5(b)(1) (2012).
193
Treas. Reg. § 53.4945-5(b)(1)(i) to -5(b)(1)(iii).
194
See infra Part IV.
187
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to the identification, treatment, and monitoring of both “good” and “profitmotivated” behavior of for-profits. The Code appears to be unsatisfactorily
designed to identify and treat the “good” behavior by benefit corporations.
This Note will propose that the key to satisfactory tax treatment under the
Code is to have a system designed to capture and deduct the expenses that a
benefit corporation spends on creating its general or specific public purpose—
its benefit expenses.
A. Charitable Contributions
Currently the Code recognizes for-profits as being able to do good only
by giving money to exempt organizations through charitable contributions.195 While charitable contributions have not always been an accepted
activity of for-profits, the current approval of charitable contributions by
corporations is reflected in the Model Business Corporation Act,196 common law,197 and the Code.198 While it might first seem that charitable contributions are consistent with the benefit corporation’s goal to create public
benefit, there are many aspects of charitable contributions that make them
an unsatisfying vehicle for receiving favorable tax treatment for its efforts
to create public benefit.
The first complication arises with the requirements that a charitable contribution be of a specific donative nature and that the contribution be made
with gratuitous intent and not in return for substantial economic value.199
To be deductible, a charitable contribution must be made as a gift, and not
in exchange for an economic benefit.200 Some interpretations add the requirement that the donor have no expectation of return benefit or that the
contribution be made out of “detached and disinterested generosity.”201 All
tests, at a minimum, require that the contribution not be given as a quid
pro quo.202 This requirement is consistent with the Code’s way of categorizing and taxing a transaction based upon the motivations behind it.203
195

See infra Part IV.
See COX & HAZEN, supra note 97, at § 4:4 n.11 and accompanying text; Model
Bus. Corp. Act § 3.02(13) (2007).
197
COX & HAZEN, supra note 97, at § 4:4 nn.8–9 and accompanying text (citing A. P.
Smith Mfg. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581 (N.J. 1953), appeal dismissed, 346 U.S. 861 (1953)).
198
Id. § 4:4 nn.15–16 and accompanying text.
199
Sugin, supra note 52, at 837 n.5. See 26 U.S.C. § 170(c) (2010).
200
Sugin, supra note 52, at 846 (citing Crosby Valve & Gage Co. v. Comm’r, 380 F.2d
146 (1st Cir. 1967); Singer Co. v. United States, 449 F.2d 413 (Ct. Cl. 1971); DeJong v.
Comm’r, 309 F.2d 373 (9th Cir. 1962)).
201
Id.
202
Id.
203
Id. at 846 n.55.
196
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Usually, the Code determines the motivations of an entity’s behavior by
starting with the correlating assumption for non-profits and for-profits.
However, because benefit corporations are motivated by both profits and
creating benefit, neither assumption leads to a clear and consistent treatment of benefit corporations. After all, benefit corporations were created
because this rigid binary structure was found to be inadequate.204
The IRS views corporations as “profit-maximizing” entities205 and
some view the recognition of charitable behavior by the Code as inconsistent with the assumptions placed on corporations in all other portions of
the Code.206 The Code assumes that all activities of a corporation are in
pursuit of profit-maximization goals, but then allows for a deduction for
charitable contributions, only if the contributions were made without expecting anything (profits) in return.207 This is contradictory, and if the
Code’s assumptions are correct, corporations will not make charitable contributions because it would breach their fiduciary duty to maximize wealth
for the shareholders and leave them vulnerable to ultra vires accusations.
However, the laws do allow corporations to make charitable contributions
without violating their fiduciary duty or facing ultra vires.208 Courts have
liberalized their view of charitable contributions as ultra vires activities
that are against the corporation’s duty to its shareholders.209 Some might
argue that because courts stopped finding charitable contributions ultra
vires, this is an indication that the purely profit-maximizing assumption is
wrong or inadequate.210 As discussed previously, however, the legality of
charitable contributions is an exception to the profit-motivated assumption, not an indication of its lessening.211
Another interpretation that comes to similar ends, but is actually supportive of the profit-maximization assumption, is that charitable giving is
in fact profit-maximizing (even if in the long run) for corporations, and
204

See supra notes 5–10 and accompanying text.
Sugin, supra note 52, at 836.
206
Id. at 836–37 (“In its treatment of corporate philanthropy, the Code adopts an
anthropomorphic conception of the corporate entity that is at odds with the profitmaximizing conception prevalent throughout the rest of the Code. It is also inconsistent
with treating the corporation as an entity that is limited by its purposes and consequently
not entitled to the rights and powers that humans possess.”).
207
Id. at 846 n.55.
208
See supra notes 195–97.
209
COX & HAZEN, supra note 97 (“A pure gift of funds or property by a corporation
not created for charitable purposes is generally unauthorized and in violation of the rights
of its shareholders unless authorized by statute.” (citing Roger v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582, 591–
92 (1933))).
210
Knauer, supra note 52, at 20–22, 20 n.104.
211
See supra notes 50–55 and accompanying text.
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therefore not ultra vires to begin with. 212 There need not be any exception to
ultra vires to legally allow charitable contributions because it is in the best
financial interest of the shareholder.213 If one begins with the assumption
that the managers and directors of a non-benefit, for-profit, corporation act
in the best interest of the shareholders, one can conclude that although a
charitable contribution might be immediately wealth-reducing, it will ultimately be profit-maximizing if it is in the long-term best interest of the
company.214 Even before the creation of benefit corporations, some suggested that another theory of corporate purpose falls under the “social responsibility model,” which assumes a broader “enlightened self-interest”
purpose behind charitable giving and philanthropy.215 Again, this is still a
somewhat troubling inconsistency in the Code because if corporations get
something in return for doing good, then there is not the donative intent
required to qualify for a deduction.216
If charitable contributions must be given entirely as a gift with no return
benefit for the benefit corporation, this will be almost impossible, especially given the fact that benefit corporations are now legally required to
do socially responsible behavior such as give charitable contributions. For
example, a valid specific purpose for a benefit corporation is “increasing
the flow of capital to entities with a public benefit purpose.”217 If that were
a benefit corporation’s incorporated purpose, it would clearly be receiving
some sort of benefit by making charitable contributions, if only by avoiding
legal liability for failure to do so. It is because benefit corporations serve
two purposes, and simultaneously, through the same action, show that
economic and social benefit are not mutually exclusive,218 that they seem
unfit for the charitable contribution provisions.
212

See, e.g., Schoenjahn, supra note 15, at 463–64 (discussing Bill Gates’s concept of
“creative capitalism” where “activities that benefit a social good, would make up for any
lost profits by driving up stock prices—through enhanced corporate reputation—and
increasing human capital—through attracting higher quality employees”).
213
Id.
214
Sugin, supra note 52, at 858–59.
215
Knauer, supra note 52, at 20 (“If the goal of a corporation is to maximize
shareholder profit and gain, then a corporate ‘gift’ must advance that end. On the other
hand, if a corporation has responsibilities to constituencies beyond its shareholders (or to
society at large), then a corporate ‘gift’ must address these responsibilities.”). Id. at 9–10
(“Because corporate giving is inherently self-interested, a corporate transfer to charity
cannot qualify as a ‘contribution or gift’ under section 170. This notwithstanding, each
year corporations deduct billions of dollars under section 170.”).
216
See infra Part IV.B.
217
Clark & Babson, supra note 1, at 841 n.107 and accompanying text.
218
Business FAQ’s, supra note 8.
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B. Goodwill
One suggestion to fixing this “donative intent” problem is to reclassify
charitable contributions as purchases of goodwill.219 Classifying charitable
contributions as a purchase of goodwill220 would also prevent the government from subsidizing the purchase of goodwill disguised as charitable
contributions.221 An overarching difficulty of this interpretation is that
goodwill is an asset,222 and it seems difficult to imagine that benefit expenses will directly result in a goodwill asset of that amount of value, let
alone that it will result in valuable goodwill at all.
One problem with classifying the expenses that benefit corporations
use to create “benefit” as purchases of goodwill is that the benefit corporation does not necessarily expect higher profits, or any financial return on that
spending. It is more accurate to say they receive a goodwill “halo effect”
from their status as a benefit corporation, not truly from their activities as a
benefit corporation beyond the fact that they have to do those activities in
order to keep their status.223 B Lab openly states that a perk of becoming a
benefit corporation is the connotation the label will pass on to the public.224
Benefit corporations have to pass the test to wear a real halo in order to
receive its effects.225
V. CURRENT TREATMENT OF GOOD BEHAVIOR BY FOR-PROFITS
An understanding of the complications facing benefit corporations,
due to the fact that it is difficult to classify and discern the nature and motivations behind the benefit corporation’s behavior, will help understand
the discussion on for-profits acting “good” that follows.
A. Charitable Contributions
Businesses can currently take deductions for charitable contributions.226
To qualify as a charitable contribution, certain criteria must be met regarding
219

Knauer, supra note 52, at 9.
47A C.J.S. Internal Revenue § 152 nn.4–5 (2012); Treas. Reg. § 1.162-20(a)(2).
221
Knauer, supra note 52, at 10.
222
See id. at 7.
223
Id. at 6–7, 9–10.
224
Benefits of Becoming a B Corp, B LAB, http://www.bcorporation.net/why_become
_a_B (accessed by searching the Internet Archive index for Aug. 21, 2012).
225
Declaration of Interdependence, B LAB, http://www.bcorporation.net/declaration
(accessed by searching the Internet Archive index for Oct. 5, 2012).
226
26 U.S.C.A. § 170 (2010).
220

298

WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 4:269

who receives the charitable contribution227 and the nature of the contribution (both intent and form).228 The Code also requires that the contribution
be substantiated.229
1. Qualifying Donee
To be deductible, the charitable contribution must be given to an entity
qualified to receive charitable contributions according to § 170(c).230 Generally speaking, this means a 501(c)(3) organization, charity,231 or government unit.232 Examples of § 170–permitted charitable contribution recipients
include: government entities, domestic charitable organizations, veterans’
organizations, domestic fraternal societies, and cemetery companies.233 If the
organization is not listed under § 170(c), then contributions to the organizations are not tax deductible. This includes most social welfare organizations,234
labor organizations,235 business leagues and chambers of commerce,236 and
home owners associations.237 Additionally, for a charitable contribution to
be tax deductible, it must be given to a domestic organization.238
One of the reasons that charitable contribution deductions will not enable a benefit corporation to deduct all of its benefit expenses is because
the recipient of the donation will not always qualify under § 170(c).239
Where a stakeholder is as broad as “the community,” and the benefit corporation chooses to spend money directly on the community instead of funneling it through a non-profit, it might even be difficult to determine who
is the recipient of the benefit. This difficulty also supports the rationale for
227

Id.
See supra Part IV.
229
26 U.S.C.A. § 170(f)(8) (2010).
230
STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND RELATING
TO THE FED. TAX TREATMENT OF CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS, 6 (2011) (scheduled for a
Public Hearing before the Senate Committee on Finance on October 18, 2011) [hereinafter
COMMITTEE REPORT].
231
See supra Part III.A.
232
COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 230, at 1. In 2010, one third of charitable contributions were given to religious organizations. Id.
233
26 U.S.C. § 170(c). Exempt Organizations Select Check, IRS, http://www.irs.gov
/Charities–&–Non–Profits/Exempt–Organizations–Select–Check (last visited Feb. 2, 2013)
(listing all organizations that have registered as tax-exempt, although it is not a complete list).
234
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4) (2012).
235
§ 1.501(c)(5).
236
§ 1.501(c)(6).
237
COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 230, at 10.
238
§ 170(c)(2)(A).
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Id.
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tax exemption for non-profits.240 Cutting out the requirement to have a
non-profit middleman for funneling funds through could raise the overall
efficiency of benefit creation, especially when considering the similarities
of the “community” stakeholder and some of the example definitions of
charity such as “combat community deterioration,” “relief of the poor and
distressed or of the underprivileged.”241 Additionally, the hope is that benefit corporations’ stakeholders will include those overseas as well as those
located domestically and assumedly, then, some of the benefit activities of
the benefit corporation would be directed towards foreign locations.242
This would seem particularly true since a typical concern in social responsibility programs is a sustainable and ethical supply chain, and many goods
are manufactured abroad. Under the current law for charitable deductions,
the money spent creating benefit overseas will likely not qualify as a deduction because a qualifying donee must be a domestic organization.
2. Form—Must Be Cash or Cash-Equivalent
The contribution must be in the form of either property or money.
Contributions of services are not deductible.243 If the contribution is property, then the company must donate the entire interest in that property.244
While all benefit expenses will have to be valued, quantified, and correspond with real financial cost, it is unlikely that a benefit corporation will
satisfactorily serve its public benefit by simply writing checks. There are
occasions where for-profits and non-profits join together, and the forprofit is actively involved beyond writing a check and the charitable contribution is still valid.245 One limitation on form, that if applied to benefit
corporations might fail to capture the good created, is that a company donating property must donate its entire interest.246
3. Good Behavior Beyond Writing Checks
For-profits and non-profits pair up together to leverage the attributes of
the other and to create some social benefit.247 This is an example of how
240

See supra Part III.
§ 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2). See supra Part III.A.
242
Schoenjahn, supra note 15, at 461 (stating that “U.S. corporations donated $7.7
billion to developing countries” in 2008).
243
26 U.S.C. § 170.
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Id.
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See infra Part V.A.3.
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26 U.S.C. § 170 (f)(3).
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Schoenjahn, supra note 15, at 467.
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difficult it might be to discern and qualify donative intent. For-profits do
engage in activities with non-profits, such as marketing campaigns, that
clearly create profit while still doing social good. Any corporation can engage in mixed activities, such as an apparel company selling special shirts
with a non-profit’s logo and, in turn, donating a certain percentage of the
proceeds to that non-profit.
4. Balancing Test
There are many different instances where a mixed behavior activity
could occur. One, like the profit-sharing example above, is a form of
cause-related marketing.248 Here, a for-profit will use the logo and name of
a non-profit to help sell an item, hopefully create goodwill (or, more accurately, borrow the goodwill of the non-profit), and boost the overall profits
of the company.249 Because the for-profit gets these perks in return, the percentage of profits given to the non-profit act more as an investment than a
donation. On the reverse side, it is as if the non-profit has lent its assets
(name and goodwill) to a for-profit and received a fee for its service—a
service that does not support its charitable purpose (selling clothing). The
non-profit does, in return, get marketing and exposure that might help
raise awareness and benefit its cause. The concern is that this activity will
be marketed as good behavior deserving favorable tax treatment, but in
actuality it will be more profit-motivated. One suggestion is that the test to
determine whether this activity can receive any favorable tax treatment is
to “ensur[e] that the private benefit to the corporate partner is not substantial in comparison to the benefit the charity receives.”250
An example of a mixed behavior where there is a clear divide between
the “good” and self-interested behavior is purchasing seats at a charity
dinner.251 The concern for the business is that in order to deduct a charitable
contribution, the donor must receive nothing in return and in this example
248

Helge, supra note 124, at 885–86.
Id. (“But when the for-profit corporation also receives, in return for its support of
the charity, the right to use the name or logo of the charity to directly affect the sale of the
corporation’s product, the corporate sponsorship has morphed into cause-related marketing. Cause-related marketing is a more ‘direct effort to sell the [corporation’s] products or
services by capitalizing on the public’s desire to leverage their dollars: consumers can
buy a product and support a good cause at the same time.’ By engaging in cause-related
marketing, ‘the corporation expects its sponsorship dollars to yield a measurable return
not just in terms of public image and goodwill, but product sales as well.’”).
250
Id. at 953.
251
John D. Colombo, The Marketing of Philanthropy and the Charitable Contributions
Deduction: Integrating Theories for the Deduction and Tax Exemption, 36 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 657, 663 (2001).
249

2013]

BENEFIT EXPENSES

301

the donor is receiving a meal. The IRS has issued a Revenue Ruling252 that
held that the deductible amount is the “excess of the fair market value of the
return.”253 If a business purchases seats at a charity dinner for fifty dollars
each and the tickets have a fair market value of twenty dollars, then the
business will be able to deduct the difference of thirty dollars. The reason
for this is that this amount has no reciprocal benefit to the donor-business
(it is as if the business purchased the seats at the fair market value of twenty
dollars and then wrote a separate check for thirty dollars). In profit-sharing
models between for-profits and non-profits, the profit-motivated behavior
of selling apparel risks tainting the preferential tax treatment that would
have been given to purely good behavior. The non-profit may risk losing
tax exemption on the donated share of profits due to the fact that it is generated from unrelated business activities (in some respects, leasing its goodwill).254 The for-profit risks the deduction for a charitable contribution due
to the fact that they are receiving a direct benefit (the percentage of the
profits they are not donating) in return for their contribution. If the nonprofit were to do it themselves, not only would it probably cost more, but it
could trigger the UBIT, and lead to disqualification of the exempt status.255
Even if a benefit corporation objectively creates enough public benefit
to qualify an activity as a charitable contribution under a balancing test,
the donative intent requirement may otherwise limit its qualification. In
Transamerica Corp. v. United States,256 a corporation was denied the classification of a charitable contribution for the expenses spent on the construction of a road it built for the City of Oakland.257 The court found that
by nature of the road being located close to its building location, the corporation intended to receive some benefit from the road’s construction and
it did not meet the donative intent requirements.258 To qualify as a § 170
deduction, the court ruled that a contribution must be that of “detached
and disinterested generosity” or that of “affection, respect, admiration,
252

Id. at 663; see Rev. Rul. 67-246, 1967-2 C.B. 104.
Colombo, supra note 251, at 663.
254
Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1 (2006).
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§ 1.501(c)(3).
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254 F. Supp. 504, 514–15 (N.D. Cal. 1966), aff’d, 392 F.2d 522 (9th Cir. 1968).
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Id.
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Id. After the § 170 deduction was denied, Transamerica argued that the expense
should be classified as a § 162(a) deduction and the government argued that it should be
capitalized because the benefit of the paved road will extend beyond one year. Id. Not
only might it be complicated to quantify the amount of benefit a benefit corporation receives for a benefit-creating action, it may also be difficult to determine the length of
time for which the benefit corporation receives that benefit. The length of time for which
the benefit is considered to be enjoyed may impact the tax treatment of the expenses
incurred in the activity. See infra notes 289–91 and accompanying text.
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charity or like impulses.”259 The paved road would benefit the City of
Oakland and the general community, both by providing the community
with the use of the paved road as well as alleviating the city from spending
the tax money it would have had to spend to pave the road itself.260 The
company’s involvement in building the road appeared to fall under some of
the definitions of “charity” included in the Treasury Regulations such as
“erection or maintenance of public ... works” and, “lessening of the burdens
of Government.”261 This focus on the subjective intent of the activity instead of the overall benefit created by the activity may restrict the applicability of charitable contributions to many benefit corporations’ activities.
This crossover of a for-profit performing activities for a tax-exempt
purpose lends itself well to the similar analysis undertaken in determining
the application of UBIT or PRI to tax-exempt organizations engaging in
profit-motivated behavior—both to determine if the behavior is related to
the public purpose and to what degree the behavior is intended to meet
that public purpose.262
VI. CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTION COMPARED TO OTHER
DEDUCTIBLE EXPENSES
Viewing charitable contributions as ordinary and necessary business
expenses reconciles some of the problems with trying to apply the model
for deductions for charitable contributions to benefit expenses. Even without the incorporated general or specific public benefit purpose, some
fourth sector advocates argue that by allowing for good behavior like charitable deductions, the Code legitimizes managers’ choice to make corporate philanthropy “part of the corporation’s trade or business, despite the
fact that they are allowed to be wealth-reducing for the corporation.”263 In
other words, philanthropic behavior by corporations is so common that its
expenditures could be considered the same as any other incurred by a corporation in its ordinary course of operation and deductible as such.
A. Ordinary and Necessary
Corporations are able to deduct under § 162 “all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any
259

Id. at 515 (quoting Comm’r v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960); DeJong v. Comm’r,
309 F.2d 373 (9th Cir. 1962)).
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trade or business.”264 For a deduction to be allowable as a trade or business expense under § 162 it must be ordinary and necessary.265 This provision by the IRS supports the idea that the purpose of taxation is to tax only
profit-motivated income.266 This is because the taxpayer is allowed to deduct the expenses that are incurred while producing profits—the Code
matches expenses with income.267 The income left not matched with a deductible expense is profit and is taxed.268 While trade or business is typically defined as profit-motivated behavior, this is not applicable for benefit
corporations, which in some ways have created a new trade or business.
For an expense to be considered ordinary, it does not have to happen
regularly during the lifetime of the business, or be an expense that will occur
in all trades or businesses.269 The goal of this requirement is not to discourage or penalize odd, quirky ways to run a business.
For an expense to be considered necessary, it does not have to be absolutely indispensible to achieving the goals of the trade or business.270 The
expense must just be “appropriate and helpful.”271 There is also allowance
for the differences in business judgment of activities that will help achieve
the trade or business.272
To understand how charitable contributions could be considered ordinary and necessary for all businesses, it might be appropriate to view the ten
percent cap on charitable deductions as the feature that single handedly
makes this possible.273 Applying the relevant theories when non-profits
264
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participate in a trade or business, the ten percent cap ensures that the
wealth-reducing behavior does not become “not insubstantial.” Viewing
the ten percent cap as a means to keep corporate donation within a scale
that is ordinary and necessary of generally profit-maximizing businesses is
also consistent with fiduciary duty views.274 For example, directors receive vast amounts of deference—the business judgment rule—for determining whether the day-to-day decision-making was in the best interest of
the company.275 The ten percent cap almost guarantees that the company
will not donate so much money so as to possibly start serving a public
benefit at a financial cost to the shareholders.276 This is similar to the nonprofit standards that disallow a tax benefit for activities routinely engaged
in by the non-profit that are unrelated to its exempt purpose.
Viewing charitable contributions as common still renders some inconsistencies under the Code. The conclusion that philanthropic behavior is so
commonplace that it is “ordinary and necessary” under § 162277 conflicts
with the Code’s disallowance of deductions under § 162 that would otherwise have been deductible under § 170 if it were not for the ten percent
cap on deductions.278 The solution for benefit corporations then, might be
to get rid of § 170 charitable contributions and their ten percent cap and
view all benefit expenses as ordinary and necessary to the trade or business of being a benefit corporation. Allowing the directors of a benefit
corporation to exercise judgment that reduces shareholder wealth in order
to serve its social purpose is exactly the type of behavior that benefit corporations intend to make ordinary and necessary.279 Directors of benefit
corporations open themselves up to liability for not doing good, because to
act contrary to their state-incorporated general and/or specific public purpose would now be considered ultra vires.280
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Viewing both profit-motivated behavior and socially motivated behavior as ordinary and necessary to a benefit corporation adequately reflects
and captures the Benefit Expenses that it will incur throughout its life.
Benefit corporations would not have to worry about funneling all of their
charitable behavior through a qualified non-profit, or by creating their own
in-house non-profit. Google has responded in this way by creating a nonprofit entity, Google.org, through which the for-profit entity Google.com
can channel its philanthropic efforts.281 Some for-profits have set up related
non-profits and funnel money through those entities.282 It is likely that
larger non-profits, like Google, will never become benefit corporations
because it might be difficult for them to find the mass of like-minded investors and shareholders that wish to spend their money on socially oriented businesses that might produce lower profit margins.283 However, by
allowing benefit expenses to be defined as ordinary and necessary, the directors of the likely private and closely held stock corporations that wish
to become benefit corporations will have more flexibility and control over
serving that social purpose. Additionally, the directors will not be constrained by the degree to which they do so, or by having to rely on a related
non-profit to create the benefit as a conduit.
One possible complication with treating benefit expenses as ordinary
and necessary is that assets that have a useful life that extends beyond the
calendar year must be capitalized.284 The complication raised by this point
is similar to those seen with defining the social benefit created by nonprofits—who is the recipient?285 Benefit expenses would be expenses used
toward furthering the specific or general public purpose, and not private
purposes, and the benefit corporation would not actually receive an asset
for which it could capitalize.286 Because the purpose and motivation of
benefit expenses is similar to charitable donations, and charitable donations are fully deductible in the year that they are made, a good argument
could be made that benefit expenses could also be fully deductible in the
year that they are made. Deducting all of the benefit expenses in the year
in which they were made would likely be favorable to the corporation, as
taxpayers typically prefer to deduct expenses in the earliest year possible.
281
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VII. SUBSTANTIATION
It is easy to imagine criticism arguing that a deduction for “good behavior” as an ordinary and necessary benefit expense, and which rests in
part on the deference to the directors, may be too easily taken advantage of
and benefit corporations could deduct all expenses, including those that do
not actually create real social benefit. This is the same concern that dictates the substantiation of charitable contributions.287 A written record
must be kept of the charitable deduction that lists the name of the donee
organization, the value of the contribution, and the date contributed.288 If
the contribution is noncash property and is more than $500, then the substantiation must include a form that qualifies the contribution with the taxpayer’s return.289 Substantiation also plays a key role in the balancing test
when considering the private and public balance of UBIT and PRI, which
is required to be substantiated and monitored in order to meet the expenditure responsibility requirements.290 Like substantiation for many activities
under the Code, each of these situations is based on the specific facts at
hand,291 and this may add to the number of transactions the IRS must monitor and enforce.
The non-profit sector has received similar criticism regarding organizations abusing the tax benefits given to it by the Code.292 The IRS has
requested increased accountability, transparency, and good governance
from non-profit organizations293—the same increased standards that benefit corporations choose to meet.294 Fortunately for the IRS, benefit corporations are monitored by a third party and also must issue an annual Benefit
Report stating all of the benefit activities it has done that year.295 While
the monitoring third party might not audit every benefit corporation it
monitors each year it likely performs regular audits and keeps reports for
each benefit corporation, such as B Labs does.296 This extra set of eyes
287
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and substantiation will help ensure that the expenses incurred by benefit
corporations are actually creating real social benefit. This motivation to
create real social impact and not just ineffective and exaggerated marketing of social responsibility is the main mission of B Labs,297 and having
that label will help ensure that deductions for benefit expenses are actually
going to create social and public benefit as the IRS intends by its favorable
treatment. This is similar to an exempt organization status providing that
entity with the assumption that their activities will be for social good, and
that the activities of a for-profit are for generating profits. Benefit corporations may at least be granted the rebuttable presumption that the Code currently fails to give other for-profits.
VIII. FURTHER OPPORTUNITIES
As briefly mentioned earlier,298 benefit corporations are allowed to
adopt a specific public purpose in addition to the general public purpose,
such as California’s Flexible Purpose Corporations (FlexC).299 The general
public purpose is the broader stakeholder model of benefit corporations300
and the specific purpose is one that would otherwise qualify as an exempt
purpose.301 If a FlexC were to adopt a special purpose that was same as an
exempt purpose under 501(c)(3), the “good behavior” engaged in by the
FlexC will even more closely resemble the “good behavior” to which the
IRS gives favorable tax treatment. The FlexC legislation explicitly allows
for a corporation to be involved in the mixed behavior activities previously
discussed,302 which another corporation would have had to funnel through a
non-profit with the FlexC’s equivalent specific exempt purpose.303 Allowing
benefit expenses only for those benefit corporations that elect a specific
purpose may help put those skeptical of benefit corporations a bit more at
297
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ease. For substantiation purposes, it will be easier to classify and identify
whether the expense was related to that specific purpose. For those that
are skeptical about the capability of for-profit corporations to create real
social benefit and not just engage in social-washing, this might be a more
appealing, and limiting, option. A more specific purpose would assumedly
better lend itself to transparency and substantiation, and also result in fewer
tax deductions.
CONCLUSION
Undoubtedly, benefit corporations challenge the existing concept of
profit-maximizing corporations. Because benefit corporations clearly remove
themselves from the confusion by getting states to legitimize their dual
purpose, the treatment of benefit corporations in many areas of corporate
law may begin to see the same change originally intended for fiduciary
duty. Treatment by the Code is no exception. Benefit corporations legitimize the fourth sector and the Code must accommodate its entrance into
state legislation. The Code repeatedly looks to the purpose and intent of
transactions in order to determine their treatment, and it treats activities
that legitimately benefit society favorably. Benefit corporations are a new
class of corporation, which earn their entity status by participating in the
same socially responsible activities as a tax-exempt organization, and planning to do so on a regular basis. This regular use of benefit expenses can be
viewed as ordinary and necessary to the trade or business of benefit corporations, especially as advocates such as B Labs continue to fight so hard to
change the corporate law view of business purpose so that it includes creating public benefit as ordinary and necessary for all corporations.
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